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What do we know and how do we know it?
These are the weighty questions posed by
VikiMcCabe in her recent book,Coming to
Our Senses: Perceiving Complexity to Avoid
Catastrophes. The book deconstructs dis-
asters ranging from the tragic attack on
Iran Air Flight 655 to the rise of Wall
Street’s derivatives market and the con-
struction of no-outlet levees that would
eventually fail New Orleans. In the pro-
cess, it highlights how decision makers
went wrong and draws grand conclusions
about the nature of human perception and
mental representation.
McCabe’s central argument hinges on
the idea that valuable clues about natu-
ral systems are revealed through structural
information, or patterns that character-
ize everything from the branching tree
limb to the spiraling whirlpool. Humans
struggle to mentally represent complex
systems and the patterns they produce.
We try to translate structural information
into symbols such as words or to men-
tally break complex systems down into
their component parts, butMcCabe argues
that these abstractions and deconstruc-
tions can’t wholly capture nature’s intri-
cacy and dynamism. Instead, she suggests
that humans have evolved to directly per-
ceive meaningful structural information
without our conscious awareness.
The book provides several examples of
this concept, among them the remarkable
process by which we recognize a human
face. Rather than relying exclusively on
singular features like a nose or mouth to
recognize a face, we use the face’s layout, or
spacing between features, to drive much of
the recognition process. McCabe dedicates
an entire chapter to face recognition and
the better part of another to showing that
the same principles apply when we recog-
nize bodies and bodily motion. Although
she presents them as representative exam-
ples of how the brain works, face and body
recognition are actually exceptions rather
than the rule. Humans are far more sensi-
tive to structural information in faces and
bodies than other types of objects (Farah
et al., 1998; Reed et al., 2003).
According to McCabe, catastrophes
occur when people construct theories and
rely on their internal representations of the
world rather than their direct perception
of it. Throughout the book, she pits the-
ory against perception and shows how the
former falls flat. Yet it is ultimately this
false dichotomy that falls flat. The human
ability for abstract mental representation
is a crucial component of our species’
success and technological advancement. It
is impossible to launch a rocket, place a
satellite in orbit, or construct a function-
ing cell phone based on perception alone.
Moreover, perception and theory are far
more intertwined than the author admits.
No perception is truly direct. Like every-
thing else that takes place by way of the
brain, perception is a product of neural
representation and is subject to influence
by theory-based phenomena like attention
and bias. At the same time, any theory
worth a grain of salt is constructed and
updated based upon information orig-
inally collected through the senses. At
one point, McCabe defines theory as
“ideas about the world that originate in
someone’s mind, rather than from observ-
able evidence.” Yet if every reference to
theory is confined to that narrow defini-
tion, the book spends 250 pages railing
against a straw man. Would anyone in his
or her right mind argue that decisions are
best made when we close our eyes, cover
our ears, and ignore all available evidence?
Many of the neuroscience descriptions
in the book were also misleading or mis-
informed. For example, on page 91 the
author argues that the brain is fractal.
“Because molecules have a specific shape
that can recognize other shapes, they are
the ultimate pattern recognizers. Although
research is needed to see how far their
recognition of shapes can go, it would not
be surprising to find that this molecular
recognition translates up to the distributed
neural networks that underlie the percep-
tion of biological motion and recognition.”
This description may sound nice but it
is nonsensical. Molecular signaling within
and between neurons is wholly different
in nature and structure from neural net-
works, which in turn do not necessarily
give rise to structural motion processing
by virtue of their interconnected wiring.
Among other missteps, McCabe mixes up
axons and dendrites (page 90), provides an
erroneous explanation for phantom limb
syndrome (page 140), and states that our
perceptual skills are located in the right
hemisphere (page 171).
Despite these problems, I was most
troubled by the practicable message that
casual readers may take away from the
book. Its central argument is that theories
only muddle the truth we subconsciously
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receive through our senses. To grasp that
truth, we should follow our intuitions. As
McCabe writes on page 47: “Intuition is
simply the act of directly detecting struc-
tural information on a subliminal level.”
Yet intuitions reflect far more than our
perception of structural information. They
reflect prejudice, bodily sensations, and
emotions that can spur us to make bad
decisions (e.g., Bolte et al., 2003; Dunn
et al., 2010).
Unfortunately, the problems with
this book are not unique among popu-
lar psychology books. Psychologists and
neuroscientists have highlighted similar
issues in books by the likes of Malcolm
Gladwell and Jonah Lehrer (Engber, 2007;
Pinker, 2009; Chabris, 2013). To some
degree, these problems may stem from the
challenges of writing about science for a
general audience. They may also reflect
selection or editorial pressures from pub-
lishing houses that have found a recipe
for financial success in books that make
sweeping, counterintuitive claims about
human behavior. While more measured
science books tend not to top the best
sellers lists, many manage to delight and
inform readers without overstating their
case.
McCabe has crafted a highly read-
able book about human nature filled
with interesting anecdotes and compelling
prose. A casual reader may come away
from its pages feeling that he or she learned
something profound about the human
mind. Yet as the book itself states, “words
easily distort, reframe, or replace what
actually is the case without anyone becom-
ing the wiser.” In the end, Coming to Our
Senses falls prey to many of the errors that
it tries to warn against.
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